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Eﬀorts to regionalize cardiac services can increase access costs for patients. This study quantiﬁes
this trade oﬀ by estimating the eﬀects of changes in the regulation of hospital services on treatments
and outcomes. A demand model for surgery services is speciﬁed in which heart attack victims form
expectations of the need for and productivity of surgery in their choice of hospital and treatment.
The results indicate that mortality is relatively insensitive to moderate changes in policy: changes in
travel costs and volume oﬀset one another. Despite similar health outcomes, the competing policies
have diﬀerent implications for taxpayers.
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11 Introduction
Many states regulate the number and location of hospital services in markets. For example, certiﬁcate-
of-need (CON) regulations require a hospital to show the medical need of additional services, such as
a cardiac surgery facility, in any given market before states permit entry or expansion (Conover and
Sloan 1998; Vaughan-Sarrazin et al. 2002). In the case of cardiac facilities, regulators face a trade oﬀ
between proximity and intensity of use.
Prompt treatment of heart attacks can improve health outcomes dramatically. Allowing additional
cardiac surgery services, either in a market or in new markets, could reduce the distance many patients
would need to travel to receive treatment, especially in rural areas. The majority of empirical studies of
hospital choice have found that distance/travel time is the primary factor in choice of hospital (Porell
and Adams 1995). While distance is important, there is also evidence that patients are willing to
travel a little farther in order to take advantage of facilities at higher quality hospitals (Hodgkin 1996;
Tay 2002). The willingness to trade distance for quality is likely a nonlinear function of health status:
patients with extremely mild or severe attacks might not ﬁnd the additional services worth the cost of
travel. Thus, one important issue in the regulation of services is the eﬀect it will have on access costs
for patients, costs that might be more likely to be borne for higher quality services and costs that vary
by health status (Adams et al. 1991).
A drawback of geographically diﬀuse cardiac facilities is the lower volume of surgeries performed
at each facility. If learning-by-doing is important for physicians and/or economies of scale exist in
the production of cardiac surgeries, then regulators have an incentive to concentrate the provision of
services in a few centers. A large medical literature has found that higher volume surgery providers have
better health outcomes from surgery (e.g., see Dudley et al. 2000; Halm et al. 2002, for reviews of the
literature). The volume literature has suggested policies based on these ﬁndings, often that hospitals
oﬀering surgery services should perform a minimum number of procedures per year. The Leapfrog
group, a consortium of insurers and providers, have recommended minimum volume thresholds (e.g.,
500 coronary artery bypass grafts (CABGs) per year) to be met by surgery providers (Shahian and
Normand 2003). These recommendations are the result of a literature that deals almost exclusively
with estimating a type of health production function with provider volume as an input. The volume
literature does not model the decision-maker’s optimization problem and therefore can say little about
predicted behavior in the face of changing regulation.
2This model extends the volume literature by allowing hospital and treatment choices to respond to
changes in regulation policy. It does this by estimating a structural model of demand that accounts
for the trade oﬀs between distance and volume at the individual level along with estimating the health
outcome production function. The model’s key feature is that decision-makers form expectations of the
need for and eﬀectiveness of surgery when making treatment decisions. Thus, they respond to changes
in the eﬀectiveness of treatment in all stages of the treatment process: admitting hospital, diagnostic
procedures, and curative treatment. For example, lower hospital surgery volume makes surgery less
eﬀective in reducing mortality and, therefore, surgery services less attractive for an individual in the
choice of hospital.
The treatments this study focuses on are catheterization, percutaneous transluminal coronary an-
gioplasty (PTCA), and CABG. Catheterization is used to visualize the blood ﬂow in coronary arteries
and serves as a diagnostic tool to determine the necessity of revascularization surgeries such as an-
gioplasty and bypass surgery. Angioplasty uses a small balloon to open up blood ﬂow in a blocked
artery. Bypass surgery uses veins from other parts of the body to create an alternate path for blood
ﬂow around the blocked artery. In what follows, “surgery” refers to angioplasty or bypass surgery.
The model is used to conduct two policy experiments. The ﬁrst asks the following question: what
would happen if the average heart attack victim had a surgery hospital that was closer but with
lower volume? It provides simulations of the eﬀect of decentralization of cardiac surgery services
on hospital choice and transfer, catheterization, surgery, and mortality rates. The second policy
experiment simulates the enforcement of minimum volume thresholds for surgery services. Using the
estimated structural parameters, low-volume surgery services, deﬁned by diﬀerent threshold levels, are
eliminated and treatment choices and outcomes are predicted.
Overall, the results indicate that one-year mortality is relatively insensitive to moderate changes in
policy, either in the direction of decentralization of cardiac services or toward centralization of services.
However, this is not the result of travel costs and volume being unimportant; it is the result of these
two crucial factors oﬀsetting one another. Decentralization lowers the utility costs of surgery at the
same time that surgery becomes less eﬀective due to lower volumes. Centralization leads to fewer, but
more eﬀective, surgeries.
Despite similar health outcomes, the competing policies have diﬀerent implications for taxpayers.
Medicare reimbursements for cardiac surgery would be lower under the centralization policy. It is
important to note that this is a partial equilibrium result: the demand model in this study does not
3capture supply-side changes in the market induced by alternative policies.
The study proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the hospital choice and volume-outcome
literature with an emphasis on the contribution of the current research. Section 3 describes the data
and sample used to estimate the structural model. Section 4 presents the dynamic discrete choice model
and empirical speciﬁcation. Section 5 discusses the estimation strategy and identiﬁcation. Section 6
provides estimation and simulation results. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Trade Oﬀ between Distance and Volume
The primary focus of this study is the trade oﬀ many patients and physicians face between choosing
a hospital that is close and choosing a hospital that is of high quality. Despite the urgent nature of
heart attacks, there are reasons to believe that a trade oﬀ between distance and quality could still
occur. First, ambulance protocols allow discretion in the choice of hospital based on the health status
of the patient (e.g., see the example protocol in Athey and Stern 2000). Furthermore, paramedics
can begin basic treatment before arrival at the hospital, which might provide incentives to seek better
quality hospitals when available (Meischke et al. 1995). Second, many individuals do not use emergency
medical services (EMS). Studies have found that only 42 to 45% of heart attack patients use ambulatory
services to get to the hospital (Meischke et al. 1995; Gurwitz et al. 1997). Couple this with the fact
that most individuals signiﬁcantly delay seeking care at all (Dracup et al. 1995), and it is possible that
once they decide to go to the hospital, they might use discretion. Third, heart attack has been used as
the primary diagnosis before in the literature (Hodgkin 1996; Tay 2002, 2003). Evidence concerning
the trade oﬀ between distance and service oﬀerings is given below.
The primary quality measure considered in this study is hospital surgery volume. A large medical
literature has found that larger volume is associated with better health outcomes (Luft et al. 1990;
Hannan et al. 1997; Jollis et al. 1997; Dudley et al. 2000; Canto et al. 2000). (Hamilton and Hamilton
(1997) is an exception looking at hip surgery.) There are three primary explanations for the observed
relationship between volume and outcomes (Luft et al. 1990). The ﬁrst explanation posits a direct
causal pathway: physicians and hospitals learn how to treat a patient or master a procedure by seeing
more patients with the same diagnosis or repeating a procedure (i.e., learning-by-doing). The second
explanation is reverse causation: providers with good outcomes attract more patients (i.e., selective
referral). The third explanation is that the correlation between outcomes and provider volume is
4spurious, the result of omitted variable bias. Thus, some other provider attribute, which is correlated
with volume, directly aﬀects patient outcomes.
This study limits the inﬂuence of selective referral by using patient-level data and focusing on
a category of bypass surgeries that are likely non-elective. First, the use of patient-level data will
make endogeneity less of a problem; an individual’s outcome or complication has a small eﬀect on the
overall volume of the provider (Norton et al. 1998). Second, selective referral is more likely for elective
procedures. The surgeries observed in this study’s sample are less likely to be elective in nature (see
section 3). Showstack et al. (1987) ﬁnds that the largest eﬀects of CABG volume are for unscheduled
treatments.
Hospitals are distinguished in the dynamic model based on their distance from the patients and
their oﬀerings of specialized services. In order to check for omitted variable bias, other hospital
characteristics such as ownership and teaching status were included in the health transitions. These
variables were insigniﬁcant conditional on health status.
Despite caveats raised by the empirical issues above, most researchers agree that a relationship
exists between volume and outcomes. Given that volume relates to better outcomes, many types of
policy recommendations have been issued to promote regionalization (or centralization) of services. If
increased volume truly causes better health outcomes (and perhaps lower costs), then patients (and tax
payers) would beneﬁt from shifting procedures from low-volume providers to high-volume providers.
Even if volume is simply correlated with the true mechanism improving outcomes, there is still room
for policies based on provider volume. Volume is an easily measurable proxy of quality in this case,
especially given the diﬃculty in collecting and disseminating more direct, risk-adjusted data on quality
and process mechanisms. Groups such as the Leapfrog group, a consortium of insurers and providers,
have recommended minimum volume thresholds (e.g., 500 CABGs per year) to be met by surgery
providers (Shahian and Normand 2003).
A cost to regionalization is the eﬀect it has on access to surgery for patients (Norton et al. 1998;
Shahian and Normand 2003). Centralization of surgery services has the potential of increasing travel
times for many patients, especially in rural areas. This implies that proponents of regionalization
should consider the distributional eﬀects for patients.
Recent studies in the volume literature have begun to address the trade oﬀ by examining the eﬀects
of simulated closures of low-volume providers on travel distances to remaining providers (Grumbach
et al. 1995; Dudley et al. 2000; Chang and Klitzner 2002; Birkmeyer et al. 2003; Trogdon 2004). These
5studies provide a starting place for assessing the eﬀects of regionalization as a policy goal on patient
access to services. Trogdon (2004) is the ﬁrst study to model how treatment choices respond to the
removal of low-volume services. This study extends the volume literature to predict not only how
access to services would change under such a policy, but also how treatment choices and outcomes
would change.
3 The Cooperative Cardiovascular Project
Regulation changes that alter the number and location of cardiac services within a market will lead
to changes in the demand for those services, and hospitals with those services, as well as potentially
aﬀect health outcomes. Cardiac services located closer to a larger number of potential patients provide
beneﬁts through easier access to care, but at the cost of less eﬀective treatment if procedure volumes
are lower. The data used in this study are excellent for studying the changes in demand that result
from such policy changes.
First, the data used in this study is a large, nation-wide sample of individuals, which provides
power to help identify parameters associated with rare health events and outcomes. The data also
contain geographic identiﬁers that make it possible to trace the eﬀects of changes in the eﬀectiveness
of treatment (e.g., changes in hospital surgery volumes) back to the choice of hospital; individuals face
a trade oﬀ between travel time to a hospital and the presence and eﬀectiveness of cardiac surgery at
the hospital and will respond to changes in either dimension.
Second, the data provide extremely detailed information concerning health status at each stage of
the treatment process: existing comorbidities at the time of the heart attack, initial severity of the
heart attack at admission to the hospital, and the results of diagnostic tests that provide information
about the need for curative treatment. The availability of information concerning comorbidities at the
time of the choice of hospital allows preferences for hospitals to vary by health status in a more detailed
way than in previous hospital choice studies. The information about severity of the heart attack is
unique to clinical data and not available in administrative discharge records. It provides important
information to identify treatment choices. The data also include records of treatments received in the
case of transfer to another hospital, allowing the researcher to observe the full set of treatment choices
for each individual.
Finally, in the estimation of the eﬀect of hospital surgery volumes on outcomes, clinical data are
6important for conditioning on patient health status (e.g., see Sowden et al. 1995). In the volume
literature using hospital-level data, a major concern is that the volume-outcome relationship could be
due to high-volume hospitals operating on healthier patients. This study uses patient-level data and
extensive information about severity to control for patient health while measuring the eﬀect of volume
on one-year mortality.
The primary data for the individuals in the study come from the Cooperative Cardiovascular
Project (CCP). The CCP was initiated by the Medicare program with the goal of improving quality
of treatment received by Medicare patients experiencing heart attack (Jencks and Wilensky 1992;
Ellerbeck et al. 1995). The CCP collected patient data through medical record review for a nationally
representative random sample of Medicare patients.
The original CCP sample consisted of randomly selected patient records for patients admitted to
nonfederal acute care hospitals between February 1994 to July 1995 with a primary diagnosis of acute
myocardial infarction (AMI) (ICD-9-CM 410, excluding a ﬁfth digit of 2). Some patients in the CCP
sample were transferred to other hospitals. The CCP sample is merged with the respective Medicare
Part A claims data for these and subsequent admissions. The data are merged by including in an
episode of care all of the admissions that occurred consecutively, or within one day of each other. This
deﬁnition of an episode of care minimizes the number of elective surgeries, for which selective referral
is more likely. The claims data allow me to construct the remaining treatments received by individuals
originally admitted to hospitals participating in the CCP. The claims data are also used to calculate
the Medicare surgery volume for each hospital in the sample.
Hospital data come from the American Hospital Association’s (AHA) Annual Survey of Hospitals
1994 and 1995. Distances between individuals and hospitals are calculated using zip code data from
MapInfo 5.0. Using the latitude and longitude for the centroid of each zip code, straight-line distances
in miles are calculated using standard great circle trigonometric formulas. 1
The sample used in estimation meet the following criteria. First, since the CCP is a sample of
Medicare beneﬁciaries, each admission should have Part A claims data available; individuals who have
admissions without such data, or admissions to other specialized types of hospitals, are dropped (N =
8,565).
1Birkmeyer et al. (2002) uses ArcView to classify roads, which are assigned average speeds, to calculate travel time.
However, Phibbs and Luft (1995) show that use of straight-line distance rather than road distance often does not signiﬁ-
cantly impact hospital choice estimates.
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heart attack is available, all individuals are dropped who have previous episodes in the data or are ﬁrst
admitted from somewhere other than home (N = 47,432). This sample cut is made for two reasons.
First, patients initially transferred from another hospital have had previous and unknown care. Second,
the distance calculations are made based on zip code of residence. For patients admitted from other
locales (e.g., nursing homes), these calculations would be incorrect.
Third, individuals who choose hospitals outside of the designated choice set are dropped (N =
45,191). 2 The choice set is the nearest hospital in each of three service categories: no specialized
services, catheterization only, and open heart surgery. Each of these service categories, if chosen by an
individual, provides a unique set of treatment choices. At the same time, heart attack victims are not
expected to bypass several hospitals for treatment. In addition, this deﬁnition of the choice set keeps
the size of the state and parameter spaces manageable. The remaining sample of patients is more likely
to have had their heart attacks close to home, minimizing the error in the distance calculations.
Finally, patients who have unexplained sequences of procedures are dropped from the sample (N =
3,764). For example, these include patients with procedures at hospitals that do not have a record for
those facilities, patients who have surgery recorded without a diagnostic procedure, patients who have
multiple procedures recorded, and a small set of patients who transfer to hospitals that do not oﬀer
heart surgery. This leaves a sample of 82,055 patients for the analysis. For computational reasons (see
section 5), portions of the model are estimated on a random 5% sub-sample (N = 4,103).
The sub-sample used for estimation closely matches the demographic and health characteristics
of the full sample (Table 1). The mean age in both samples is 77. Both samples are evenly divided
between men and women, contain similar shares of minorities (9%), and are mostly urban.
The samples exhibit substantial variation in health status and heart attack severity. Initial health
status is measured using the Charlson score, a weighted sum of comorbidities, where the weights are
proportional to the risk of death from each comorbidity (Charlson et al. 1987). Higher values indicate
worse health. Nearly half of the samples have important comorbidities as measured by the Charlson
index.
Killip class, a measure of severity at admission, is used as the initial assessment of the severity of
the heart attack. Using a method developed by Killip and Kimbal (1967), heart attack patients are
2Individuals who live in Alaska are also dropped from the analysis set. The distances in the state are non-representative
of the rest of the sample.
8classiﬁed into one of three classes: those with no evidence of congestive heart failure (CHF) (1), those
with mild to moderate CHF (2), and those with overt pulmonary edema and/or cardiogenic shock
(3). Thus, a higher classiﬁcation indicates a more severe heart attack. Killip class has been shown in
the medical literature to provide a concise representation of the severity of heart attacks (Rott et al.
1997; DeGeare et al. 2001). Approximately half of the samples have evidence of at least moderate
congestive heart failure (CHF) at presentation to the hospital (i.e., Killip class greater than I). Finally,
the vast majority of those patients who receive information concerning systolic function by having
catheterization show a moderate reduction; approximately 10% of individuals have severe reduction.
Most patients choose no-service hospitals for the initial admission. These are the most common
type of hospital in the sample and, on average, are closest to the individual (Table 2). Catheterization-
only hospitals are the rarest type of hospital in the sample. Hospitals providing catheterization and
surgery are slightly over-represented in the estimation sample. Medicare patients make up one fourth
to one half of total procedures in hospitals (Jollis et al. 1997); the Medicare surgery volumes in the
estimation sample correspond to average overall hospital surgery volumes between 70 and 105 in 1994
and between 115 and 170 in 1995.
Treatment choices are combinations of a choice for procedure and transfer to another hospital. One
third of the sample have catheterization and half of those patients go on to have surgery (Table 1).
Approximately 16% of patients are transferred during the treatment process. One year after admission,
one third of the individuals in the sample have died.
4 Dynamic Model of Hospital and Treatment Decisions
The goal of the structural dynamic discrete choice model is to fully incorporate 1) the sequential
nature of the decision-making process, 2) the information revealed along the decision path, and 3) the
constraints current choices place on future options. The resulting estimates of the structural parameters
are then used to provide information about how changes in service oﬀerings aﬀect the allocation of
patients into hospitals, treatments, and outcomes.
It is assumed that individuals and their providers have identical preferences over hospitals and
treatments. Equivalently, the provider’s role is that of a perfect agent, providing information to the
individual, who then has the ﬁnal decision concerning care. This is a strong assumption, especially in
a situation with such large asymmetries of information (see McGuire 2000, for a review of the agency
9literature in health economics). It is made for two reasons. First, data limitations preclude consistent
linking of patients with their physicians, which would be necessary to model more complex agency
relationships. Second, this assumption simpliﬁes the modeling of uncertainty. Physicians and health
care providers have repeated interaction with hospitals and are likely to be well informed as to the
characteristics of the hospital and the technology of treatment. Therefore, uncertainty enters the model
through the uncertainty about future health status. In what follows, “individual” refers both to the
patient and to the collection of decision-makers working on behalf of the patient.
4.1 Timing
There are four periods in the dynamic model; individuals make decisions in the ﬁrst three of these
periods. In the ﬁrst period, the individual has a heart attack. He has information about his initial
health status and his preferences for types of hospitals. The component of preferences unobserved to
the econometrician is modeled as a draw from the distribution of tastes for types of hospitals. Based
on this information he subsequently chooses a hospital. In the second period, individuals receive initial
information about the severity of the heart attack. They next receive a draw from the distribution of
tastes for catheterization and choose whether or not to undergo catheterization, which could include
transfer to another hospital. In the third period, conditional on choosing catheterization, individuals
receive information about the systolic functioning of their heart. Then they receive a draw from the
distribution of tastes for surgery and choose a surgery option, which again could include a transfer.
Mortality outcomes are determined in the fourth period. Individuals do not make a decision in the
last period but form expectations about the outcomes that factor into decisions made earlier.
4.2 Choices
In this model, individuals make choices over the type of hospital for admission and the treatments of
catheterization and surgery, including the possibility of transfer. Each period represents one of these
choices. In the ﬁrst period, individuals choose a type of hospital. Hospitals are characterized by the
specialized services they oﬀer and distance from the individual. Let j = 1,2,...,J represent each















The vector representing the decision at time one is d1 = (d1
1,d2
1,...,dJ
1). Empirically, the choice set
includes the nearest hospital in each of three service categories: no specialized services, catheterization
only, and open heart surgery (J = 3).
In the second period, individuals choose whether or not to undergo catheterization, which could
include transfer to another hospital. Using the same notation as above, denote the diagnosis choices
in the second period by c = 1,...,C and deﬁne a vector of decision dummies representing the period
two choices as d2 = (d1
2,d2
2,...,dC
2 ). Empirically, the choices include no transfer/no catheterization, no
transfer/catheterization, transfer/no catheterization, and transfer/catheterization, respectively (C =
4). One and only one of the components of d2 must equal one, but the choice set in the second
period is restricted in some cases by the choice made in period one. For example, if a no-service
hospital is chosen in the ﬁrst period, then the second period choices are limited to c =1, 3, or 4; no
transfer/catheterization is not an option.
Finally, the surgery options s = 1,...,S available to individuals in the third period are no trans-
fer/no surgery, no transfer/surgery, transfer/no surgery, and transfer/surgery: d3 = (d1
3,...,d4
3). Part
of the importance of the dynamic decision process is that the surgery choice set is also conditional on
previous decisions. Speciﬁcally, surgery is only available to individuals who received catheterization in
the second period. Table 3 shows the decision tree facing an individual in the model.
4.3 State Variables
The hospital and treatment decisions are made using the information available at the time of the
decision. This information set is deﬁned by a collection of state variables. The state variables describing
individuals as they enter the model include demographic characteristics—age; gender (male, female);
race (white, minority); and residence in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)—as well as an index
of health status. The Charlson index, h ∈ H = {1,2,3}, summarizes individuals’ health status at the
time of the heart attack.
Each individual has a unique hospital choice set. Hospital characteristics include specialized services
(no specialized services, catheterization only, and surgery capabilities); distance from the individual in
miles; and Medicare surgery volume. Let D represent the individual’s demographic characteristics, X
11represent the hospital characteristics in the choice set, and Z represent all of the individual’s stationary
characteristics: Z = (D,h,X).
The next set of state variables drive the dynamic trade oﬀs individuals face in making hospital and
treatment decisions. In order to solve the model using backward recursion, all dynamic state variables
are discretized. It is also necessary to specify the distributions of all dynamic state variables included
in the model (see Section 4.4). After the hospital choice, information is revealed concerning the severity
of the heart attack. At admission the individual receives an initial severity diagnosis by categorization
into a Killip class, k ∈ K = {1,2,3}. In the third period, the catheterization reveals information about
the extent of blockage b ∈ B = {1,2,3}, where the categories correspond to normal, mild to moderate
reduction, and severe reduction in left ventricular ejection fraction.
The information set at time t, It, grows each period as individuals learn more about the nature of
the heart attack:
I1 = (Z) (4.1)
I2 = (d1,k;Z) (4.2)
I3 = (d1,k,d2,b;Z) (4.3)
I4 = (d1,k,d2,b,d3;Z) (4.4)
4.4 Transition Probabilities
Individuals are forward-looking and form expectations about the possible health states they will be in
conditional on the decisions they make. In forming these expectations the individuals use the following
transition probabilities.
The probability of Killip class k is a function of the information set in period one and the hospital
decision and takes a multinomial logit form:
(4.5) P(K = k) ≡ πk
K(d1,Z;δk), k = 1,2,3
where δk is a vector of parameters. Age, gender, and race are included to account for diﬀerences in
the severity of heart attacks across demographic groups. The probability of a particular Killip class
is also determined by initial health status: sicker patients initially (e.g., patients with hypertension or
previous heart attack) are likely to have a higher probability of a more severe heart attack. Distance
traveled and its interaction with residence in a MSA allows the severity status at admission to depend
12on the travel time to the hospital. This allows for one type of travel cost, namely that the heart attack
itself might worsen with delay.
The probability of a particular blockage category b depends the characteristics of the individual,
including realized health status from the ﬁrst period, and takes a multinomial logit form:
(4.6) P(B = b) ≡ πb
B(k,h,D;βb), b = 1,2,3
where βb is a vector of blockage parameters. The motivation for demographic characteristics and initial
health status is the same as in the Killip transition. Here, not only does initial health aﬀect the severity
of the heart attack, but also the initial severity assessment.
In the ﬁnal period, nature determines whether the individual lives or dies. This study focuses on
mortality at one year post admission. In doing so, the model is able to trace the impact of patient
characteristics, including health status, on the demand for hospitals, the treatment process, and the
ultimate outcome. The probability of mortality in period four is given by the logit probability
(4.7) P(m = 1) ≡ πm(d3,b,k,h,D,X;η)
where η is a vector of parameters. Similar to the other health transitions, mortality rates are allowed to
diﬀer across demographic groups. Previous health status (b,k,h) are also an important determinant of
mortality. The coeﬃcient on the surgery decision, d3, measures the eﬀect of the treatment on mortality
outcomes. This eﬀect is also allowed to vary by surgery volume. This is where the beneﬁt of high
hospital surgery volume enters the patient’s decision-making process.
4.5 Utility
Individuals receive utility in each period based on the choices they make. Period one utility from














10 captures the baseline utility from a hospital of service type j. Flow utility in period one is also
a function of health status (α
j
11h), the distance to the type of hospital chosen (α12), and interactions
of the two (α14h). This speciﬁcation allows travel cost to vary by individual health status. Distance
is interacted with a urban/rural indicator to make distance a better proxy for true travel costs (α13);
distance in a metropolitan area will have a longer actual travel time than the same distance in a rural
area. 
j
1 is the utility from hospital choice j unobserved by the econometrician.


















Catheterization and surgery impact the ﬂow utility directly for two reasons. First, both of these
invasive procedures involve pain and discomfort, especially in the recovery process. This is captured
in the choice-speciﬁc intercepts αc
20 and αs
30. Second, these procedures involve risks for side eﬀects
and these risks diﬀer by health status. The same is true for transfer; transfer to another hospital is
stressful and disorienting. Thus, there exist utility costs for the treatment choices in the model that are
balanced by the decision-maker against the beneﬁts of information gathering and improved outcomes
through treatment. c
2 and s
3 are the unobserved components of ﬂow utility for catheterization and
surgery, respectively.
The model only focuses on one measure of health outcome, one-year mortality. However, the
medical literature has shown that heart surgery can also improve quality of life (Allen et al. 1990;
McKenna et al. 1994; Papadantonaki et al. 1994; Hlatky et al. 1997). In order to capture this type of









3) if m = 0
0 if m = 1
Terminal utility is normalized to zero for death; α40 captures the utility from surviving the episode.
Utility at the end of the heart attack episode is a deterministic function of health status; some indi-
viduals will have a lower valuation of surviving the heart attack and consequently not be as willing to
pursue invasive treatments. The model assumes Killip class status has no long term eﬀects. However,
blockage, if not treated by surgery, does have long term consequences (α42b). Finally, surgery in the
third period provides utility through its eﬀect on quality of life (α43).
4.6 Dynamic Optimization
In each period, individuals choose an option from the relevant choice set to maximize expected lifetime
utility. In this model, the information available at the time the individual makes his decisions depends
14on his past decisions. The dynamic model can be solved recursively, working backwards from the last











In period three, individuals choose a surgery option to maximize the current utility from surgery
and the expected value of utility next period. Let U denote the deterministic part of ﬂow utility. Then
the expected lifetime utility when choosing s in period three conditional on choosing catheterization















where β is the discount factor. The expected lifetime utility when choosing s in period three conditional





















Thus, if patients do not have catheterization, they form an expected value of utility as a function of
their blockage status.
In order to clearly show the eﬀect of past choices on current and future choice sets, let j = 1,2,3
represent hospitals with no specialized services, catheterization only, and surgery services, respectively.




























The ﬁrst two components of (4.15) are just the ﬂow utility from choice c. The expected maximized
utility in period three has three components. The ﬁrst is the expected utility next period when choosing
no transfer/catheterization at a catheterization-only hospital in period two. The expectations are with
respect to 3. In this situation, the surgery options are no transfer/no surgery, transfer/no surgery, and
transfer/surgery. The second component is the expected utility next period when catheterization is
15chosen at a surgery hospital, either by transferring to a surgery hospital (d4
2) or by choosing a surgery
hospital in the ﬁrst period (d2
2 ·d3
1). In this situation, transfer is not necessary. The ﬁnal component is
the expected utility next period when choosing no catheterization, which leaves only the no transfer/no
surgery option. 3




























Again, each choice of hospital corresponds to a diﬀerent choice set available next period. Individuals
that choose a hospital without specialized services (d1
1) cannot choose to have catheterization without
transfer in the next period. Individuals that choose a surgery hospital (d3
1) do not have to transfer to
another hospital in future periods.
5 Estimation








γ is the Euler constant and ρt is the scale parameter for period t. This distributional assumption allows
for estimation of the dynamic model by yielding a closed-form solution for the expected value of the
future value functions and choice probabilities. Speciﬁcally, let V l
t represent the deterministic portion
of the value function for choice l in period t. Then the probability of observing an individual making














If an individual does not choose catheterization, neither he nor the econometrician know the block-
age status. If an individual chooses catheterization after transferring to a non-CCP hospital, then he,
but not the econometrician, knows the blockage status. In all cases, individuals provide information
3Some patients in the sample are observed to have transferred hospitals but not to have received either catheteri-
zation or surgery at either hospital. For these cases it is assumed that the transfer was in period two; no transfer/no
catheterization and transfer/no surgery is not observed in the data.
16for the surgery and mortality probabilities. The likelihood of observing an individual’s choices and



























3 · πm(·)1(m=1) (1 − πm(·))
1(m=0)
(5.2)
To take advantage of the information concerning the surgery decision and mortality outcomes from all
observations, the likelihood for individuals whose blockage was unobserved in the data integrates over































5.1 Estimation in Stages
The assumption of conditional independence of the unobserved taste parameters leads to a log like-
lihood function that is additively separable across time (or decisions). This assumption precludes
correlation of the unobserved taste parameters across choices. It also assumes that there is no unob-
served heterogeneity that aﬀects assignments into health classes (i.e., conditional on observed health
status, all hospitals assign Killip class in the same way). Allowing for unobserved heterogeneity of
the Heckman and Singer (1984) type removes the additive separability of the likelihood function, but
estimation can still proceed in stages using the EM algorithm (Arcidiacono and Jones 2003). However,
a substantial amount of heterogeneity in preferences and health transitions is captured in the health
status state variables provided by the CCP. For this reason, and in order to reduce computation time,
unobserved heterogeneity of this type is not allowed.
The model is estimated in stages (Rust and Phelan 1997). First, the Killip and blockage transitions
are estimated as standard multinomial logits. 4 The estimation of the utility parameters requires a
nested algorithm which solves the dynamic model for each iteration of the parameter values. Since
each individual has a unique hospital choice set as deﬁned by the distances to each of the hospitals
and the surgery volumes at the surgery hospitals, the dynamic model has to be solved for each person
at each parameter iteration. For this reason, a 5% random sample of the data (N = 4,103) is used to
4The blockage parameters are estimated on the sub-sample of patients with observed blockage data (N = 17,163).
17estimate the mortality transition and utility parameters in stages. Using estimates for the blockage
transition (βb), consistent estimates of the mortality and period three and four utility parameters (η,
α3, and α4) are obtained simultaneously. Using these estimates, utility parameters for period two
(α2) are recovered from a multinomial logit for the catheterization decision. Finally, these estimates
together with consistent estimates of the Killip transition (δ) allow recovery of the period one utility
parameters (α1) using a conditional logit model for hospital choice. Consistent standard errors are
obtained by taking one Newton step on the full likelihood function at the consistent estimates from
the multi-stage estimation.
5.2 Identiﬁcation
Each period in the model represents a diﬀerent choice. Therefore, the estimation is essentially a series of
multinomial logits with a diﬀerent dependent variable in each period. Identiﬁcation of the parameters
for each choice is given by variation in treatment choices across health states (and distances for the
hospital choice). This diﬀers from other applications of dynamic discrete choice models that rely on
variation over time in state variables to identify repeated choices (for examples in health economics
see Gilleskie 1998; Khwaja 2003).
As in standard multinomial logit models, parameter normalizations are required for identiﬁcation
of the model. The parameters for the ﬁrst category in each health transition (i.e., δ1 and β1) and each
period’s utility (i.e., αt1) are normalized to zero. Utility parameters in the ﬁrst period are relative to
choosing a hospital with no specialized services and in the second and third periods are relative to
choosing no transfer/no procedure.
The variance for the unobserved taste parameters is allowed to diﬀer for each period. Each period’s
utility parameters are relative to the scale parameter for that period. The discount factor (β) is not
separately identiﬁed from the scale parameters; the estimates are a function of the discount factor and
the relative variance of the unobserved tastes between periods (i.e., β (ρt+1/ρt)).
Finally, the parameters in the terminal utility function are identiﬁed partially by functional form
assumptions. All of the variables included in the terminal utility are also included in the mortality
transition and are expected to aﬀect both equations similarly. For instance, worse health status will
lower both the probability of survival and the utility of survival. Variation in surgery decisions across
health states in the data not fully explained by the impact of health and surgery on mortality will
identify the terminal utility parameters.
186 Results and Policy Simulations
The parameters of the Killip transition are generally signiﬁcant and most variables aﬀect the probability
of a particular Killip class in expected ways (Table 4). In particular, older individuals have a higher
probability of transitioning to a higher Killip class. Higher Charlson categories relative to the lowest
category lead to a higher probability of a more severe Killip class. The distance traveled to the hospital
and its interaction with residence in a MSA are included in the Killip class transition to allow the time
traveled to the hospital to aﬀect health status at arrival. However, these variables do not have a large
eﬀect on Killip class at admission; the distance parameters are signiﬁcant only for the highest Killip
class and the odds ratios are 0.99 and 1.00, respectively.
Similar patterns appear in the results for the transition to blockage categories. Older individuals
have a higher probability of transitioning into the moderate reduction category relative to the normal
category. Age was not signiﬁcant for the transition to severe reduction. As with Killip class, worse
health status in earlier periods leads to a higher probability of worse systolic function. For instance,
patients in Killip class III or IV have signiﬁcantly higher probabilities of also having severe reduction
(relative to normal function).
Health status, in every period of the model, is important in determining one-year mortality. Patients
admitted with a Charlson greater than 3 are 85% more like to die within a year of admission than
patients in the lowest Charlson category; patients in Killip class III or IV are twice as likely to die
than patients with Killip class I; and patients with severe reduction are over four times more likely to
die than patients with normal systolic function. Older patients have higher probabilities of mortality
but there does not appear to be any signﬁcant diﬀerences between males and females and across races.
Surgery, especially at higher surgery volume hospitals, is beneﬁcial in reducing the probability
of mortality at one year post admission. This estimate controls for detailed health status, which
controls for selection at surgery hospitals. This substantial beneﬁt to surgery provides an incentive for
individuals to pay the utility costs for the procedure and to choose surgery hospitals in order to avoid
the cost of transfer. The cost of providing geographically diverse, lower volume surgery hospitals is
that surgery at these hospitals will not be as eﬀective at reducing one-year mortality.
The second set of estimates in the dynamic model are the utility parameters. Hospitals with
catheterization and surgery services are preferred to no service hospitals, all else constant (Table 5).
Individuals with worse initial health status, as measured by the index of comorbidities, have higher
19preferences for surgery hospitals relative to no service hospitals. This provides evidence that hospital
choice is responsive to health status. Increased distance to the hospital lowers the probability of
choosing that hospital. In addition, the disutility from distance is higher for individuals living in
urban areas due to the fact that travel time is higher in urban areas for a given distance. There is no
evidence of the disutility from distance varying by health status.
The utility parameter estimates for catheterization indicate that there are signiﬁcant utility costs
to this procedure. The choice intercepts measure the utility from each choice relative to choosing no
transfer and no catheterization. All three of the intercepts are negative and signiﬁcant, which indicates
that transfer and catheterization have utility costs to the patients, most likely in terms of the pain
and suﬀering associated with the procedure itself and the subsequent recovery. There is little evidence
that the costs from transfer and catheterization vary by health status.
The results for the utility parameters associated with the surgery decision are similar to those for
the catheterization decision. Again, the parameters are relative to choosing no transfer/no surgery.
The intercept for transfer/no surgery is negative and signiﬁcant, indicating the transfer itself is costly
in utility terms to the individual. Transfer/surgery also has signiﬁcant disutility. However, these costs
do not vary signiﬁcantly by health status.
Finally, the positive and signiﬁcant intercept coeﬃcient in the terminal utility function indicates
that surviving the heart attack episode provides utility. There is some evidence that utility is lower
with worse health (i.e., the negative coeﬃcients on the Charlson and blockage variables) and that
surgery has long term beneﬁts (i.e., the positive coeﬃcient on surgery), but these parameters are not
measured with precision.
6.1 Decentralization of Cardiac Services
Before proceeding to the policy simulations, it is important to check that the empirical model can
predict observed behavior well. The ﬁrst two rows of Table 6 show the ﬁt of the model. The ﬁrst row
shows the mean distance in miles to the nearest surgery hospital, the mean Medicare surgery volume,
and the frequencies of choices in the estimation sample. The second row shows the predicted choice
frequencies from the structural model. The model ﬁts the data well. The choice of surgery hospital,
transfer, and catheterization predictions are very close to the frequencies in the data. The model over
predicts surgery rates by six percentage points. This is most likely due to the relative lack of signiﬁcant
utility costs to surgery as a function of health.
20Using the estimates of the dynamic model, an experiment is simulated in which cardiac services
are decentralized. The simulation tests the following thought experiment: what would happen if the
average heart attack victim has surgery hospitals that are closer but with lower volume? The simulation
is run with a variety of distance/volume trade oﬀs: for each person in the sample, the distance to the
nearest surgery hospital is reduced by 0, 10, 50, and 100% and the surgery volume in that hospital
is reduced by 0, 10, 50, and 100%, in all combinations. Each person in the estimation sample is
simulated 100 times for each combination of changes in distance and volume by using draws from the
distribution of unobserved tastes to solve for the optimal choice paths. The frequencies of choosing a
surgery hospital, transfer, catheterization, and surgery and mortality rates are calculated.
The bottom rows of Table 6 show the percent changes in the predicted choice and mortality outcome
frequencies for diﬀerent combinations of changes in distance to the nearest surgery hospital and surgery
volume. In general, as distance to the nearest surgery hospital decreases, holding surgery volume
constant, the fraction of people that choose a surgery hospital increases; the distance elasticity is -0.6
for small changes in distance and -1.2 for large changes in distance. Since more people are already at
a surgery hospital, transfers decrease as distance decreases.
Holding surgery volume constant, catheterization rates and surgery rates increase as distance to
the nearest surgery hospital decreases: a 10% decrease in the distance to the nearest surgery hospital
increases catheterization rates by 1.6% and surgery rates by 2.8%. The increases in procedure rates
occur because as more patients are already at surgery hospitals, they do not have to pay the utility
cost of transfer in order to have the procedure. The increases in surgery rates lead to a decrease in
one-year mortality of 0.4%.
The eﬀect of decreases in surgery volume holding distance to the hospital constant is the opposite
of that of decreases in distance. Since higher surgery volume is advantageous in the treatment of heart
attack, individuals respond to lower surgery volumes by choosing surgery hospitals, catheterization,
and surgery less often. This is evidence that individuals are forward-looking in their hospital decision.
In addition, one-year mortality increases as volume decreases: a 10% decrease in surgery volume leads
to a 0.7% increase in mortality, holding distance constant.
Improvements in health outcomes resulting from decentralization are weakened when the associated
decrease in volume is taken into account. If a decentralization policy lowers hospital surgery volume
by 10%, then the distance to the nearest surgery hospital has to decrease by at least 10% in order for
mortality rates not to increase. In the extreme scenario in which each individual has a surgery hospital
21located in the same zip code but that surgery hospital has yet to perform any surgeries (i.e., 100%
decreases in both distance and volume), both surgery and mortality rates increase by 7.6% and 4.7%
respectively. This is due to the fact that surgery is less costly in utility terms because more patients
do not have to pay the utility cost of transfer at the same time that surgery is less eﬀective in reducing
mortality.
Decentralization policies are likely to be targeted to rural populations that are much farther from
surgery hospitals. Table 7 reports the same decentralization policy simulated for the individuals in the
estimation sample in non-metropolitan zip codes. Holding distance constant, the results for decreases in
surgery volume are similar to the entire estimation sample. However, individuals in non-metropolitan
areas are twice as sensitive to decreases in the distance to the nearest surgery hospital. Thus, decen-
tralization leads to better mortality outcomes and higher surgery rates relative to the full sample for
a given reduction in volume.
6.2 Elimination of Low-Volume Services
The policy recommendations that have resulted from the medical literature have largely focused around
the setting of volume thresholds below which hospitals providing the surgery services should reconsider
their provision. Grumbach et al. (1995) and Birkmeyer et al. (2003) were the ﬁrst to address the trade
oﬀ between distance and volume in the presence of existing thresholds. They simulate elimination of
low-volume surgery services and re-calculate the travel times to the remaining high-volume surgery
hospitals. Using the estimates from the model presented above, it is possible not only to replicate their
policy experiments, but to extend the results to predict what would happen to the choice of hospital,
surgery rates, and health outcomes.
The following policy simulations use the dynamic estimation results to eliminate low-volume surgery
services from the choice set and predict the optimal choices for individuals in the estimation sample.
The simulations use threshold levels of 50, 100, and 200 procedures per year. If Medicare patients
make up one fourth to one half of total procedures, then this corresponds to thresholds from 100 to
800 angioplasties and bypass surgeries per year. The Leapfrog group recommends 500 per year. In
1995, 50 procedures was roughly the 60th percentile, 100 procedures was roughly the 80th percentile,
and 200 procedures was roughly the 95th percentile of surgery hospitals.
Table 8 shows how elimination of low-volume surgery services aﬀects distance to the nearest surgery
hospital. It shows the share of patients from the estimation sample that live within given distances of a
22surgery hospital. There are rather dramatic changes in distance to surgery providers when low-volume
services are removed. When surgery services with less than 50 procedures a year are eliminated, the
share of patients living within 5 miles of a surgery hospital falls from 36% to 23%. In addition, the
share of patients at least 50 miles from a surgery hospital more than doubles from 7% to 17%. Under
the policy with the highest threshold (200 procedures per year), 70% of individuals would have to
travel over 50 miles to reach the nearest surgery hospital.
Where previous studies of centralization end here, the model estimated in this study allows analysis
of the eﬀect of enforcement of volume thresholds on treatment decisions and outcomes. Table 9 shows
the results of removing the low-volume services and predicting forward choices and one-year mortality.
The ﬁrst two rows are the same as before for the estimation sample (i.e., observed distance to the nearest
surgery hospital, surgery volume at those hospitals, and observed frequencies for choices and outcome).
The last three rows give the same means and frequencies under the diﬀerent volume thresholds with
percentage changes from the baseline predictions in parentheses.
When surgery services with less than 50 procedures per year are eliminated, the fraction of individ-
uals choosing surgery hospitals falls from 36% to 25%. Thus, in order to receive surgery, more patients
have to transfer (17% vs. 15%). The net eﬀect of the large decrease in admissions to surgery hospi-
tals and the smaller increase in transfers is that surgery rates fall slightly (21% vs. 22%). One-year
mortality falls by less than one percent.
Eliminating surgery services with less than 100 procedures per year decreases the fraction of patients
admitted initially to surgery hospitals to 16%. Consequently, transfers increase by 24%. Interestingly,
although surgery rates fall, one-year mortality rates are not diﬀerent than in the baseline predictions.
The more stringent threshold of 200 procedures per year shows the same patterns as above except that
under this simulation one-year mortality increases by 2.5%. This policy eﬀectively eliminates almost
all existing surgery services and leaves the average heart attack victim hundreds of miles from a surgery
hospital.
In general, enforcement of threshold volume levels leads to a decrease in the share of individuals
choosing surgery hospitals initially, an increase in transfer rates, leading to a net decrease in surgery
rates. One-year mortality falls slightly under a low threshold and increases under the highest threshold
level. This provides empirical evidence for the trade oﬀ between distance and volume: concentrating
surgeries in only the highest volume hospitals will not improve mortality outcomes due to the increased
costs of accessing surgery services. However, the trade oﬀ only appears at high levels of centralization.
23For instance, eliminating surgery services with less than 100 procedures per year reduces surgery rates
while leaving one-year mortality unchanged.
7 Conclusion
State regulators face a trade oﬀ between increasing surgery volumes at hospitals and reducing the
access to cardiac services. A large literature, including this study, has shown that increased surgery
volume at a hospital reduces patient mortality. Thus, as patients and physicians weigh the costs and
beneﬁts of surgery, promoting large, regional centers may increase or decrease both surgery rates and
mortality. This study models the hospital and treatment decisions of heart attack victims. It accounts
for detailed health status of the patient and the ability of patients to transfer to surgery hospitals
during their treatment episode. The model provides predictions of the changes in hospital choices,
procedure rates, and mortality outcomes resulting from changes in the distance to the nearest surgery
hospital and surgery volume at those hospitals.
The results indicate that heart attack patients are forward-looking in their hospital decisions:
reductions in hospital surgery volume, which reduce the beneﬁt to surgery, reduce not only surgery
rates, but also catheterization rates and the probability of choosing a surgery hospital for treatment. 5
At the same time, reductions in the distance to the nearest surgery hospital have the opposite eﬀect—
they increase procedure rates and the likelihood of choosing a surgery hospital. Thus, the model
quantiﬁes the trade oﬀ faced by regulators considering changes in the supply of cardiac services in a
market.
Overall, the results indicate that mortality is relatively insensitive to moderate changes in policy.
However, this is not the result of travel costs and volume being unimportant; it is the result of these two
crucial factors oﬀsetting one another. Decentralization increases the number of surgeries but lowers
their eﬀectiveness. Centralization leads to fewer, but more eﬀective, surgeries. Therefore, despite
similar health outcomes, the competing policies have diﬀerent implications for taxpayers. Medicare
reimbursements for cardiac surgery would be lower under the centralization policy.
This study has limitations. The estimation of a structural dynamic discrete choice model is com-
putationally more costly than alternative models. This restricts the breadth of the data used in the
model. For instance, the restriction in the choice set of hospitals reduced the size of the state space
5This is not a formal test of dynamic versus myopic behavior.
24for which the dynamic programming problem had to be solved at the cost of mis-specifying the rel-
evant choice set (Tay 2003, used a larger choice set of hospitals for heart attack victims). There is
also much more information concerning health status and the severity of the heart attack in the CCP
that were not utilized in the dynamic model (e.g., see Sloan et al. 2003). Each measure of severity
ascertained after admission would require speciﬁcation of a health transition equation in order for the
decision-maker to form expectations about health outcomes.
The limitations of the structural approach are oﬀset by several beneﬁts. Most importantly, in
formalizing the decision-maker’s optimization problem, the model allows patients and their providers
to respond to proposed changes in volume in their treatment decisions. The dynamic aspect provides
an avenue for changes in volumes to aﬀect all treatment decisions through expectations of health
outcomes. Under the assumptions of the model, the technology and utility parameters can be used
to assess a variety of policy simulations beyond those observed in the data. In addition, advances in
computing power and estimation strategies can reduce the computational cost of expanding the state
space within these types of models (Keane and Wolpin 1994; Ackerberg 2001).
Second, this study only captures the eﬀect on one health outcome: mortality. The medical literature
has found that heart surgery can improve other facets of health and quality of life (Allen et al. 1990;
McKenna et al. 1994; Papadantonaki et al. 1994; Hlatky et al. 1997). The model allows utility after
the heart attack episode to vary by health status and whether or not the individual had surgery, but
the parameters are not signiﬁcant. If surgery provides health beneﬁts beyond reductions in mortality,
then the beneﬁts of the decentralization policies considered above are underestimated.
Third, up to 50% of all heart attack deaths occur before the individual reaches the hospital (Dracup
et al. 1995). Thus, the CCP sample suﬀers from a form of selection; the patients with reported health
status and hospital choices are systematically diﬀerent than those heart attack victims not observed.
In order to implement corrections for selection, some information about the selected sample would be
necessary. This information is not available for hospital-based samples. If the sample of heart attack
victims that were not admitted to a hospital had (ex ante) higher preferences for service oﬀerings (e.g.,
if they died in transit to surgery hospitals), then the policy simulations above underestimate the costs
of centralization, which would place surgery hospitals farther from these patients and perhaps increase
mortality.
Finally, these results capture only the demand-side response to changes in the market for cardiac
services. Other drawbacks to regionalization include eﬀects on competition in the hospital market
25(including the ﬁnancial impact on low-volume providers and increases in bargaining power of high-
volume providers), congestion at high-volume hospitals, and questions about physician supply under
selective referral (Dudley et al. 2000). Due to substantial deviations from the competitive model in the
hospital industry, 6 the theoretical implications of increased competition are often ambiguous in this
context (see Dranove and White 1994; Dranove and Satterthwaite 2000, for reviews of this literature).
Under cost-based reimbursement, the presence of insurance can lead hospitals to compete on the basis
of quality, which can lead to increases in costs. However, since Medicare converted to a prospective
payment system, there is some evidence that competition lowers costs (Kessler and McClellan 2000).
If this was indeed the case, the eﬀects of centralization of cardiac services described above (decreased
surgery rates and associated costs) would be partially oﬀset by the decrease in competition. A full
analysis of the welfare gains from decentralization would have to take this into consideration.
6These include the importance of insurance, imperfect information, and the role of non-proﬁt institutions (Arrow
1963).
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31Table 1: Individual Characteristics
Full Estimation1
Variable Freq. % Freq. %
Period One: Hospital Choice
Age (mean, sd) 76.89 7.32 76.76 7.12
Female 40,670 49.56 1,980 48.26
Minority race 7,270 8.86 358 8.73
MSA 58,122 70.83 2,943 71.73
Charlson index = 0 or 1 41,693 50.81 2,124 51.77
Charlson index = 2 or 3 29,070 35.43 1,452 35.39
Charlson index > 3 11,292 13.76 527 12.84
No-service hospital 31,236 38.07 1,574 38.36
Cath-only hospital 21,622 26.35 1,069 26.05
Surgery hospital 29,197 35.58 1,460 35.58
Period Two: Cath choice
Killip I 40,264 49.07 2,054 50.06
Killip II 9,647 11.76 511 12.45
Killip III or IV 32,144 39.17 1,538 37.48
No transfer/no cath 53,396 65.07 2,644 64.44
No transfer/cath 17,163 20.92 900 21.94
Transfer/no cath 1,381 1.68 68 1.66
Transfer/cath 10,115 12.33 491 11.97
Period Three: Surgery choice
Systolic: normal2 3,295 19.20 172 19.11
Systolic: moderate reduction 12,269 71.49 655 72.78
Systolic: severe reduction 1,599 9.32 73 8.11
No transfer/no surgery 67,921 82.77 3,382 82.43
No transfer/surgery 11,766 14.34 614 14.96
Transfer/no surgery 1,006 1.23 50 1.22
Transfer/surgery 1,362 1.66 57 1.39
Period Four
Dead at one year 28,091 34.23 1,369 33.37
Sample size 82,055 4,103
1 A 5% random sample of individuals is used for estimation.
2 17,163 individuals have information on blockage status in the
full sample and 900 in the estimation sample.
32Table 2: Hospital Characteristics
Full Estimation
Variable Freq. % Freq. %
1994
No service hospital 1,672 56.32 619 43.44
Catheterization hospital 523 17.62 357 25.05
Surgery hospital 774 26.07 449 31.51
Surgery volume (mean, sd)1 28.52 37.90 35.48 42.81
Sample size 2,969 1,425
1995
No service hospital 2,429 61.76 1,192 49.20
Catheterization hospital 576 14.65 528 21.79
Surgery hospital 928 23.60 703 29.01
Surgery volume (mean, sd)1 53.49 64.95 57.72 68.12
Sample size 3,933 2,423
1 The surgery volume statistics are for surgery hospitals only.
Table 3: Decision Tree
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
No-service hospital No tran/no cath No tran/no surgery
Tran/no cath No tran/no surgery
Tran/cath No tran/no surgery
No tran/surgery
Cath-only hospital No tran/no cath No tran/no surgery
No tran/cath No tran/no surgery
Tran/no surgery
Tran/surgery
Tran/no cath No tran/no surgery
Tran/cath No tran/no surgery
No tran/surgery
Surgery hospital No tran/no cath No tran/no surgery
No tran/cath No tran/no surgery
No tran/surgery
33Table 4: Health Transitions: Multinomial Logits1
Killip Class Blockage Mortality
Variable Coeﬀ. SE OR Coeﬀ. SE OR Coeﬀ. SE OR
Killip II Moderate Reduction Dead at 1 year
Intercept -3.932* 0.123 0.593* 0.263 -5.698* 0.486
Age 0.030* 0.002 1.03 0.008* 0.004 1.01 0.055* 0.005 1.06
Female 0.064* 0.023 1.07 -0.275* 0.040 0.76 -0.014 0.076 0.99
Minority 0.049 0.041 1.05 0.034 0.073 1.03 0.123 0.125 1.13
Charlson 2-3 0.295* 0.025 1.34 0.256* 0.045 1.29 0.354* 0.082 1.43
Charlson >3 0.577* 0.036 1.78 0.347* 0.082 1.41 0.614* 0.114 1.85
Killip II 0.151* 0.062 1.16 0.479* 0.117 1.61
Killip III or IV 0.585* 0.055 1.80 0.732* 0.087 2.08
Moderate reduction 0.191 0.302 1.21
Severe reduction 1.467* 0.368 4.34
Distance 2.2E-4 0.002 1.00
Dist*MSA 0.002 0.003 1.00
Surgery -0.560* 0.189 0.57
Surgery*volume -0.072* 0.015 0.93
Killip III or IV Severe Reduction
Intercept -4.367* 0.085 -2.198* 0.418
Age 0.047* 0.001 1.05 0.009 0.006 1.01
Female 0.173* 0.016 1.19 -0.533* 0.065 0.59
Minority 0.182* 0.027 1.20 0.236* 0.109 1.27
Charlson 2-3 0.742* 0.017 2.10 0.751* 0.070 2.12
Charlson >3 1.210* 0.024 3.35 1.034* 0.108 2.81
Killip II 0.603* 0.104 1.83
Killip III or IV 1.903* 0.075 6.70
Distance -0.008* 0.001 0.99
Dist*MSA 0.004* 0.002 1.00
N 82,055 17,163 4,103
ln L -76,515.80 -12,799.87 -3291.212
Asymptotic standard errors (SE) and odds ratios (OR) are reported.
* indicates signiﬁcance at the 95% conﬁdence level.
1 The reference group for each transition is the healthiest category: Killip I, normal
systolic function, and alive at one year.
2 The mortality equation is estimated jointly with the surgery decision.
34Table 5: Utility Parameters1
Hospital Cath Surgery Terminal
Variable Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE
Cath only No Tran/Cath No Tran/Surgery Alive at 1 year
Intercept 0.392* 0.091 -3.727* 0.157 -2.298 1.957 4.511* 1.449
Charlson 2-3 0.265 0.139 0.010 0.100 0.139 0.329 -0.605 1.723
Charlson >3 0.238 0.190 -0.207 0.170 0.209 0.742 -2.924 2.850
Killip II -0.103 0.146 0.003 0.219
Killip III or IV 0.031 0.109 -0.313 0.227
Moderate reduction -2.569 1.622 -3.011 1.738
Severe reduction -0.837 1.779 -0.473 3.110
Surgery 2.709 2.928
Surgery Tran/No Cath Tran/No Surgery
Intercept 0.420* 0.108 -3.329* 0.208 -0.880* 0.382
Charlson 2-3 0.334* 0.131 0.224 0.280 -0.081 0.367
Charlson >3 0.412* 0.188 -0.344 0.437 -0.235 0.700
Killip II -0.833 0.566 0.151 0.535
Killip III or IV 0.066 0.267 0.143 0.398
Moderate reduction -0.385 0.392
Severe reduction -0.396 0.901
Tran/Cath Tran/Surgery
Intercept -5.174* 0.198 -4.502* 2.047
Charlson 2-3 -0.264 0.153 -0.105 0.489
Charlson >3 0.229 0.247 0.875 0.904
Killip II 0.550* 0.216 -1.877 1.167
Killip III or IV 1.242* 0.171 -0.046 0.485
Moderate reduction -1.176 1.746
Severe reduction 0.622 2.204
Distance -0.148* 0.004
Dist*MSA -0.174* 0.009
Dist*Charlson 2-3 0.004 0.009
Dist*Charlson >3 0.018 0.012
β (ρt+1/ρt) 0.548* 0.089 5.399* 0.187 0.948* 0.378
N 4,103 4,103 4,103 4,103
ln L -2163.99 -2531.89 -3291.212 -3291.21
Asymptotic standard errors (SE) and odds ratios (OR) are reported.
* indicates signiﬁcance at the 95% conﬁdence level.
1 Utility parameters in the ﬁrst period are relative to choosing a hospital with no
specialized services and in the second and third periods are relative to choosing
no transfer/no procedure.
2 The mortality equation, surgery and terminal utility parameters are estimated jointly.
35Table 6: Eﬀects of Decentralization
Surgery
Dist. Vol. Hospital Transfer Cath. Surgery Mortality
Observed
17.44 49.48 35.58 16.24 33.91 16.35 33.37
Predicted
35.59 15.40 31.68 22.23 33.90
Percent Changes
-10 0 6.29 -3.12 1.61 2.79 -0.41
-50 0 42.57 -22.40 10.70 18.76 -2.51
-100 0 121.83 -67.60 32.73 54.39 -6.31
0 -10 -0.90 0.58 -2.18 -2.25 0.65
-10 -10 5.28 -2.53 -0.73 0.45 0.27
-50 -10 41.42 -21.62 7.64 15.65 -1.59
-100 -10 120.76 -66.82 28.50 50.20 -5.07
0 -50 -4.55 2.79 -10.89 -11.56 3.01
-10 -50 1.46 -0.26 -10.01 -9.45 2.80
-50 -50 36.58 -18.38 -4.73 2.56 1.77
-100 -50 116.35 -63.44 10.35 32.30 -0.29
0 -100 -8.29 4.94 -20.74 -22.76 5.25
-10 -100 -2.56 2.27 -20.39 -21.28 5.19
-50 -100 31.50 -14.94 -18.88 -13.36 4.99
-100 -100 111.07 -59.16 -12.91 7.56 4.72
36Table 7: Eﬀects of Decentralization–Non-Metropolitan Sample
Surgery
Dist. Vol. Hospital Transfer Cath. Surgery Mortality
Observed
38.20 42.99 14.31 24.05 30.86 12.67 33.19
Predicted
15.11 20.22 25.52 16.83 34.66
Percent Changes
-10 0 13.63 -2.18 1.33 2.85 -0.35
-50 0 112.11 -18.00 12.30 23.89 -2.60
-100 0 407.61 -71.46 54.04 93.58 -7.67
0 -10 -0.99 0.15 -0.98 -1.19 0.23
-10 -10 12.44 -1.93 0.27 1.60 -0.09
-50 -10 110.06 -17.61 10.19 21.33 -2.04
-100 -10 405.16 -70.77 49.69 88.71 -6.61
0 -50 -4.43 0.99 -4.31 -5.05 1.01
-10 -50 8.07 -0.89 -3.64 -3.15 0.84
-50 -50 101.39 -15.63 1.92 11.65 -0.14
-100 -50 395.04 -68.00 30.64 68.81 -2.65
0 -100 -7.48 1.63 -7.60 -9.15 1.62
-10 -100 4.10 0.00 -7.41 -7.78 1.56
-50 -100 92.65 -13.35 -5.92 1.54 1.44
-100 -100 383.65 -64.34 6.90 41.95 1.33
Table 8: Share of Patients Within Given Radius of Surgery Hospital
Eliminate surgery services with <:
Distance Observed 50 proc/yr 100 proc/yr 200 proc/yr
0 to 5 miles 36.22 22.54 13.19 3.46
5 to 25 miles 39.00 38.65 31.78 15.57
25 to 50 miles 17.52 21.37 19.38 10.46
50 to 100 miles 6.14 12.60 18.84 17.23
100+ miles 1.12 4.83 16.82 53.28
N 4,103
37Table 9: Elimination of Low Volume Hospitals–frequency (% change)
Surgery
Dist. Vol. Hospital Transfer Cath. Surgery Mortality
Observed
17.44 49.48 35.58 16.24 33.91 16.35 33.37
Predicted
35.59 15.40 31.68 22.23 33.90
No surgery hospitals < 50 proc/yr
32.09 106.45 25.37 17.36 31.87 21.25 33.60
(-28.72) (12.73) (0.60) (-4.41) (-0.88)
No surgery hospitals < 100 proc/yr
68.79 151.57 15.96 19.15 30.15 18.86 33.90
(-55.16) (24.35) (-4.83) (-15.16) (0.00)
No surgery hospitals < 200 proc/yr
204.80 262.92 5.80 21.11 26.69 15.10 34.74
(-83.70) (37.08) (-15.75) (-32.07) (2.48)
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